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Abstract
Mean field games is a branch of game theory that deals with large symmet-
rical games.
Born in 2006, it is now a lively research topic that poses tough mathematical
challenges and already features a broad range of applications.
Among the challenges, a system of coupled PDE plays the major role, while
current mean field games models deal with crowds behaviour, traffic flows,
macroeconomics dynamics and cancer evolution.
Our work has a dual aim: to highlight the core intuitions of this approach
and to present some of its prospects as an applied tool. To do this, we merge
the Mean Field Games analytic backbone by P. Cardaliaguet with some of
the applications by O. Gue´ant, J-M. Lasry and P-L. Lions.
The first part of our work introduces the main intuitions behind the mean
field game solution, such as the limit game definition, the forward-backward
reasoning and the fixed point nature of the mean field. We then solve a single-
shot game via the mean field approach and present a numerical simulation
of the results.
The second part shows how the same steps can be employed in the continuous
time case to obtain the coupled PDE formulation. In this general problem
setting, we prove an important existence and uniqueness theorem for the
mean field solution and characterize this latter as an ε-Nash equilibrium.
In the last part we focus on the prospects for this recent theory, presenting
some economics related applications. After a brief model of imitative pref-
erences, we discuss an heterogeneous agents, human capital based growth
model, highlighting how easily real-like scenarios can give birth to new un-
conventional PDE systems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 A difficult problem
Let us begin by considering the following framework:
N rational and homogeneous agents play in a common environment, dur-
ing a time interval [0, T ]. We allow them to have a continuous state, described
by Xit ∈ Rd, and let them freely adopt a control of the same dimension
αit ∈ Rd, that acts on their own state Xit according to the law 1:
dXit = α
i
t dt+
√
2 dBit (1.1)
Each agent plays his strategy in order to minimize his expected cost, that
we suppose to have the same form for all the agents:
JNi (αi, (αj)j≤N
j 6=i
) =
= E
∫ T
0
1
2
|αis|2 + F
Xis, 1N − 1 ∑
j 6=i
δ
Xjs
 ds+G
XiT , 1N − 1 ∑
j 6=i
δ
XjT

(1.2)
where:
• |αis|2 is a simple choice for the cost density due to the employed control;
• F (x,m) describes the cost density due to the interaction with other
agents which occurs during game evolution;
1We assume Bit to be a family of independent Brownian motions. If we allow the initial state X
i
0 to
be random and identically distributed with law m0, we also require that this law is independent from
all the Bit.
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• G(x,m) describes the cost due to the final game status.
How can we deal with this game-type interaction?
It can be observed that the cost J depends on the other players’ decisions in a particular
way: an exhaustive summary for this dependence is given by the mean distribution of
the states of the other players.
As a consequence, this remarkable property holds:
Property 1 (Symmetry). The problem setting is invariant trough permutations among
the agents, i.e. two agents who are in the same state and face the same external condi-
tions undertake the same strategy.
Note that we did not include the random states (X1t , . . . , X
N
t ) as input variables for the
cost functional J , while we did put the corresponding controls. This is consistent with
equation (1.1), since the expected value of the state Xit depends only on the adopted
control αi.
For this setting we may resort to classical game theory, but as N gets large the exact
solution would become both analytically and numerically unpleasant.2
In fact, finite game theory considers a stochastic final distribution for the agents’ states,
which is something that is really hard to calculate and deal with.
A very elegant, innovative and subtle way to tackle this scenario was introduced by Jean-
Michel Lasry and Pierre-Louis Lions in year 2006 [17, 18] under the evocative name of
“Mean field games”.
1.2 The mean field approach: an outline
In the framework described above, the mean field approach claims to provide an approxi-
mate solution of the problem for sufficiently large N by defining and solving a theoretical
infinite players version of the same game.
This limit formulation relies on the introduction of a deterministic probability measure
m(·, t) depending on time t over the state space Rd such that:
lim
N→∞
JNi (αi, (αj)j≤N
j 6=i
) = J (αi,m)
= E
[∫ T
0
[
1
2
|αis|2 + F
(
Xis,m(· , s)
)]
ds+G
(
XiT ,m(· , T )
)]
(1.3)
2Research is still focusing on this topic, since to compute the exact solution has been proved to be a
quite complex problem: the state of the art is well resumed in [11].
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Remark 2. In this new formulation, given an agent i, its cost functional does not depend
any more on the decisions of the other (N − 1) players, as it was for (1.2), since it is
evaluated upon his own strategy αit and the newly introduced common factor m.
We could say that taking the limit for N →∞ has allowed us to replace Ji with J , so
that m appears in place of 1N−1
∑
j 6=i δXis as resume of the other players’ states.
This has a profound consequence:
Property 3 (i.i.d. states). In the above limit game formulation, due to the independence
of the initial conditions Xi0 and the fact that the optimal strategy depends only on m,
the agents states described by equation (1.1) constitute an independent infinite family
of identically distributed random variables.
Let us now present the various steps that lead to build such a promising measure m
according to the mean field approach.
Step 0: Before taking the operative steps, we think it is important to somewhat justify the
above limit introduction and its result.
When N is small, each player has a certain influence on the others’ decisions, since
his state significantly affects the others’ costs. Yet, if this contribution is averaged
out all the other players’ states, we expect that for large N each player becomes
“small” and can hardly influence the overall game outcome.
Moreover, for finite N the final distribution of the player states (the game outcome)
is stochastic, since it depends from the single realizations of the independent Brow-
nian noises that appear in equation (1.1).
Given this framework, we see good hopes of simplifying our problem by letting N
tend to +∞.
In order to provide an intuitive view, we assume3:
lim
N→∞
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
δXis exists for some i (implies for every i by symmetry) (1.4)
3It is a reasonable assumption, but far from being obvious: Xi depends on the control αi which in turn
depends (for finite N) on all the other (Xj)j 6=i, so that the family (δXi) needs not to be independent.
It turns out to be true, with respect to the distance we are going to define in chapter 3, due to the
symmetry of the involved measures. The full proof can be found in [6].
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then the most critical input variable to the cost functional (1.2) becomes:
lim
N→∞
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
δXis = limN→∞
N − 1
N
 1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
δ
Xjs

= lim
N→∞
N − 1
N
 1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
δ
Xjs
+ 1
N
δXis

= lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
j=1
δ
Xjs
= lim
N→∞
mN (s) := m(s) (independent from the initial considered i)
Under reasonable regularity hypotheses on F and G the limit can move into4 Ji
definition giving:
lim
N→∞
JNi (αi, (αj)j≤N
j 6=i
) = E
∫ T
0
1
2
|αis|2 + F
Xis, lim
N→∞
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
δ
Xjs
 ds
+
+ E
G
XisT , lim
N→∞
1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
δ
XjT

= E
[∫ T
0
[
1
2
|αis|2 + F
(
Xis,m(s)
)]
ds+G
(
XiT ,m(T )
)]
= J (αi,m)
Another remarkable change occurs thanks to the infinite number of players.
As already noticed, if every agent undertakes his decisions minimizing the cost
functional (1.3), the random variables family (Xi)i∈N has the i.i.d. property.
We can then apply then apply the law of large numbers to the limit probability
measure:
m(s) = lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
δXis for every time s
thus proving that is indeed deterministic (yet still unknown).
We have just reached the first and most important milestone on our path: instead
of analysing a very complicated game tree, where the final outcome is stochastic,
we are now dealing with a single unknown deterministic distribution.
We can now move on to the operative steps.
A good starting point is to consider what happens if we assume that our rational
agents initially know m: we highlight that this could not be done with a stochastic
measure.
4It is a direct consequence of Hewitt-Savage theorem, see theorem A.6.
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Step 1: If we assume the deterministic densitym to be known, the optimal strategy adopted
by every agent can be studied by minimizing the cost over a suitable class A of
admissible controls:
inf
α∈A
J (α,m) if an optimal strategy α˜ exists, it verifies:
α˜ s.t. J (α˜) ≤ J (α) ∀α ∈ A
This optimization has to be carried out according to the cost formulation: in our
problem, it is a matter of optimal stochastic control. The details will be analysed
in section 3.1, where it will be shown that under reasonable hypotheses on F and
G an optimal strategy uniquely exists.
The final aim of this step is to define a map that gives the optimal strategy α˜ of
any agent observing m:
m(·, t) 7−→ α˜
Step 2: Since the agents states (Xit)i∈N are i.i.d., it follows that the limit measure:
m∗(·, t) = lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
j=1
δ
Xjs
coincides with the law of (for example) X1t on Rd, so that we can denote with Xt
the generic agent’s state having law m(t).
How this law can be determined depends on the problem settings. In the framework
of this introduction, the calculation of the law of Xt requires to solve the SDE (1.1).
We will perform this in chapter 3, by recalling the PDE–SDE relationship to get
an equation satisfied by the density (denoted with the same letter) m(x, t) on Rd
of the measure m(·, t).
From a general perspective, the result of this step is to build the “aggregating”
map:
α˜ 7−→ m∗(·, t)
Step 3: If we manage to prove that the composition of the steps above (the map that
“updates” our initial guess on m) converges to a fixed point in a suitable space,
we can claim that m is well defined and gets the expressive name of mean field of
the problem.
Step 4: Finally, our rationality hypothesis assures that the m predicted by our model,
which is completely known to agents, coincides with the real m. This happens
since everyone plays the optimal strategy α˜.
What happens if we come back to the real, finite case and equip the N players with the
set of strategies (α1, . . . , αN ) associated with the mean field m, making they play like
they would theoretically do in the infinite limit game?
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The answer is indeed beautiful: this solution for the finite case can be characterized as
an ε–Nash equilibrium for sufficiently large N (see section 3.4).
Before going deeper into the many details of this complex scenario, in the next chapter we
deal with an interesting toy model that allows us to acquaint with the subtle innovations
of the mean field approach.
Chapter 2
“What time does the meeting
start?”
The situation we want to describe is quite a common one.
Largely inspired by [16], we think about a meeting with many participants that has been
scheduled for a certain time, say 0: with rare exceptions, it is likely going to start some
time after it.
We can imagine that the actual beginning time T (which thus coincides with the delay)
is determined by the arrival times of the agents according to a quorum rule with required
share θ, up to a limiting starting time Tmax.
This defines a game interaction between agents: nobody likes to wait for the others to
arrive, but arriving with an excessive delay is doubtlessly embarrassing and makes it
hard to understand what is going on at the meeting.
Let us say that each agent i controls its own target time τi while his actual arrival time
ti is subject to uncertainty according to:
ti = τi + σiεi
In our toy model we assume the agents to be a countable infinite and label them with
the sequence (i)i∈N, so that (εi)i∈N denotes a family of independent N (0, 1) random
variables.
We allow for uncertainty to vary among agents. For simplicity1, we focus on a finite set
of h positive values for σi:
0 < σi ∈ {σ1, . . . , σh}
1Can we dare to assume a continuum of agents, each of those has an arbitrary σi?
See section 2.3 for a discussion.
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This set can be interpreted, for example, as a way to account for the different transport
means used by participants to reach the meeting location.
Considering an infinite number of agents leads us to assume the existence of these (finite
and positive) limit shares:
0 < pj = lim
N→∞
#{i ≤ N : σi = σj}
N
for j = 1, . . . , h
so that
∑h
j=1 pj = 1.
Finally, we make a naive choice for the single agent cost function and think it as a sum
of three components: ([x]+ is the positive part of x)
• The reputation cost due to arriving after the scheduled time (which we have as-
sumed to be 0), given by
a [ti]+
• The personal inconvenience due to arriving after the meeting has begun, given by
b [(ti − T )]+
• The waiting cost, simply given by
c [(T − ti)]+
Put together we have the following convex cost function: (a, b, c > 0)
J (τi, T ) = E
[
a [ti]+ + b [(ti − T )]+ + c [(T − ti)]+
]
where ti = τi + σiεi
At this point, we have all the elements to investigate this infinite-players game interac-
tion.
2.1 The mean field resolution
Let us build and discuss the mean field solution of this analytically simple, yet concep-
tually rich setting.
Remark 4. In order to better resemble the real circumstances, we allowed for different
σi and therefore introduced a source of structural eterogeneity. In fact, the agent’s cost
function depends on σi and so the property 1 does not hold at the general level in our
toy model.
Nevertheless, it can be noticed that any two agents that share the same σi and the same
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forecast for T choose the same τi as optimal target arrival time.
Hence, symmetry still holds within agents having the same uncertainty value and we are
soon going to rely on this fact in order to apply the law of large numbers and define the
deterministic mean field.
A good candidate to be the mean field of the problem is the limit cumulative distribution2
of the agents’ real arrival times (F ), since it allows each player to evaluate his own cost
without the need of further information on the other participants.
It can be defined by:
F (z) = lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
1{ti≤z} (2.1)
A finer observation is that the meeting starting time T is an exhaustive summary of F
for the cost evaluation of every agent and can be chosen as a simpler mean field.
Let us begin the resolution with a fundamental proposition:
Proposition 1. Given the existence of (p1, . . . , ph) as defined before, F is a deterministic
distribution on R.
Proof. We can expand according to the different uncertainty values and apply the law
of large numbers:
F (z) = lim
N→∞
N∑
i=1
1
N
1{ti≤z} = limN→∞
N∑
i=1
σi=σ1
1
N
1{ti≤z} + · · ·+
N∑
i=1
σi=σh
1
N
1{ti≤z}
= lim
N→∞
N∑
i=1
σi=σ1
#{i : σi = σ1}
N
1{ti≤z}
#{i : σi = σ1} + · · ·+
N∑
i=1
σi=σh
#{i : σi = σh}
N
1{ti≤z}
#{i : σi = σh}
= lim
N→∞
#{i : σi = σ1}
N
∑N
i=1
σi=σ1
1{ti≤z}
#{i : σi = σ1} + · · ·+ limN→∞
#{i : σi = σh}
N
∑N
i=1
σi=σh
1{ti≤z}
#{i : σi = σh}
= p1 lim
N→∞
∑N
i=1
σi=σ1
i.i.d︷ ︸︸ ︷
1{ti≤z}
#{i : σi = σ1} + · · ·+ ph limN→∞
∑N
i=1
σi=σh
i.i.d︷ ︸︸ ︷
1{ti≤z}
#{i : σi = σh}
2Our setting is unidimensional, so we can easily employ the cumulative distribution to carry out the
calculations relative to the probability measure m.
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Hence we have:
F (z) = p1E
[
1{ti≤z ∧σi=σ1}
]
+ · · ·+ phE
[
1{ti≤z ∧σi=σh}
]
= p1P
{
N (0, 1) ≤ z − τi
σ1
}
+ . . .+ phP
{
N (0, 1) ≤ z − τi
σh
}
= p1Φ
(
z − τi
σ1
)
+ . . .+ phΦ
(
z − τi
σh
)
(2.2)

It immediately follows that T (F ) is also deterministic and the following steps are well
defined.
Step 1: Assuming T to be known and deterministic allows each agent to easily minimize
his cost:
τ˜i = arg min
z∈R
E[Ji(z + σiεi, T )]
This can be achieved by verifying this implicit first order condition, sufficient for
the convexity of the cost function:
aΦ
(
τ˜i
σi
)
+ (b+ c) Φ
(
τ˜i − T
σi
)
= c (2.3)
where Φ(z) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard Gaussian variable.
Proof of equation (2.3).
To begin, we write J as:
J = E[a [ti]+ + (b+ c) [(ti − T )]+ − c (ti − T )]
For a stationary point (with respect to the target time τi) it holds:
∂
∂τi
J = aP(τi + σiεi > 0) + (b+ c)P(τi − T + σiεi > 0)− c = 0
aΦ
(
τi
σi
)
+ (b+ c) Φ
(
τi − T
σi
)
= c

We observe that the optimal τ˜i is unique, so the former relation allows us to well
define the map T 7→ (τ˜i)i∈N we are looking for in this step. Considering remark 4,
this map can be expressed in the following form:
T 7→ (τ˜1, . . . , τ˜h) thus accounting for the h different types of agents
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Step 2: We can now move on to the aggregation problem and calculate the updated dis-
tribution F ∗ as built in equation (2.1):
F ∗
(
z, τ˜1, . . . , τ˜h
)
= lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
1{τi≤z}
= p1Φ
(
z − τ˜i
σ1
)
+ . . .+ phΦ
(
z − τ˜h
σh
)
Then, for every fixed θ ∈ (0, 1), T ∗ is defined by:
T ∗(F ∗) = [F ∗]−1(θ) (2.4)
This concludes our update on T given the strategies (τ˜1, . . . , τ˜h).
Step 3: Finally, we would like to prove that the following map is a contraction:
T̂ : [0, Tmax] [0, Tmax]
T (τ˜i)i≤h F ∗ T ∗
agent optimizing LLN quorum rule
Proposition 2. If a, b, c > 0 then T̂ is a contraction mapping of [0, Tmax] with a
unique fixed point T .
Proof.
Firstly we want to find an estimate for
dτ˜i
dT
, where τ˜i is the optimal target time
for agent i. By totally differentiating (clearly σi > 0) we get:
a
U︷ ︸︸ ︷
Φ′
(
τ˜i
σi
)
dτ˜i + (b+ c)
V︷ ︸︸ ︷
Φ′
(
τ˜i − T
σi
)
( dτ˜i − dT ) = 0
[aU + (b+ c)V ] dτ˜i = (b+ c)V dT
dτ˜i
dT
=
(b+ c)V
aU + (b+ c)V
And the following bounds hold:
U ≥ Φ′
(
Tmax
σi
)
≥ Φ′
(
Tmax
mini σi
)
V ≤ 1√
2pi
so for every positive (a, b, c) it exists K < 1 such that:
dτ˜i
dT
≤ K < 1
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We can now move on to verify the contraction mapping condition.
Denoting with (τ˜i)T the h optimal arrival times for a given T , we introduce the
following map:
F∗(z, T ) = F ∗(z, (τ˜i)T )
and note that from the previous point it holds ∀T, and y > 0:
(τ˜i)T+y ≤ (τ˜i)T +Ky ∀ i ≤ h
Therefore an opposite inequality holds for the cumulative distributions:
F ∗
(
z, (τ˜i)T+y
) ≥ F ∗(z, (τ˜i)T +Ky) = F ∗(z −Ky, (τ˜i)T )
F∗(z, T + y) ≥ F∗(z −Ky, T ) (2.5)
Recalling the (2.4) definition for T ∗, we observe that for every y > 0 and cumulative
distribution function F (·) it holds:
T ∗(F (· − y)) = T ∗(F (·)) + y
and T ∗ is lower for cumulative functions that rise earlier: hence, applying T ∗ to
both sides of (2.5), the inequality is again reversed and we finally get:
T̂ (T + y) = T ∗(F∗(z, T + y)) ≤ T ∗(F∗(z −Ky, T ) = T ∗(F∗(z, T )) +Ky
T̂ (T + y) ≤ T̂ (T ) +Ky
T̂ (T + y)− T̂ (T ) ≤ Ky where K < 1

Step 4: As in the general framework, from rationality we derive that the expected T will
coincide with the realized one.
Therefore our analysis, which is exact due to the infinite number of agents consid-
ered, gives (T, (τ˜i)i∈N) as a consistent solution.
How far have we moved from the section 1.1 framework?
Our toy model is not a differential game with continuous time t, since agents take just
a single strategic decision (a so called one-shot game). Its state space has dimension 1;
traces of the Brownian motions can be found in the normal realizations εi.
Moreover, the mean field T is not a probability measure on Rd but reduces to a scalar:
this latter fact happens since T acts as an exhaustive summary for each agent of the
deterministic distribution F .
We can easily imagine a context where F would be the problem mean field: for example,
we can assume (according to the equation (1.3) form) that the agent i reputation cost
depends on the share of participants that have arrived before ti, and not just on the
distance from T .
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2.2 Numerical simulation of the toy model
The straightforward structure of our model allows a full numerical simulation.
We consider h agents’ categories, corresponding to the different agents uncertainties.
From the previous analysis we know that for every fixed T there are exactly h differ-
ent strategies (τj)j=1,...,h, which can be easily computed by numerically solving equa-
tion (2.3). This corresponds to step 1, as we are computing the response of every agent
to a given mean field T .
From equation (2.2) we know the exact expression of F ∗(z) as function of the τi, so it
can be numerically inverted to obtain the unique deterministic T ∗ such that:
F (T ∗) = θ
In this way we completely built the “mean field updating” map T̂ . Proposition 2 grants
that it is a contraction from [0, Tmax] to itself, so we can numerically find its unique fixed
point.
Let us now discuss in further detail some aspects relative to the parameter choices.
2.2.1 Cost function parameters
Denoting with τ the agent’s target arrival time, t the actual arrival time and T the
meeting starting time (while it was scheduled for T=0), the agent cost is given by:
J(a,b,c)(t, T ) = E

c(T − t) for t ≤ 0 (implies t ≤ T )
c(T − t) + at for 0 ≤ t ≤ T
at+ b(t− T ) for t ≥ T
It can be noticed that given an ordered triple (a, b, c) it holds:
J(λ(a,b,c))(t, T ) = λJ(a,b,c)(t, T )
and they have the same minimal conditions, hence our model is scale invariant. There-
fore, we can assign freely one of the three, and we choose to set:
b = 1
Are there any value sets for (a, c) that produce a foreseeable outcome for the fixed point
T?
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Proposition 3. Let us consider a particular choice for the agent population and the
required quorum: we assume that h = 1, so all the agents show the same uncertainty
level, and θ = 0.5. With these parameters, for every given T all the agents adopt the
same τ˜i = τ and moreover it is going to be T = τ since by the time τ exactly a half of
them will have arrived.
We claim that some values of the cost parameters (a, c) can a priori determine the
starting time T , in the following way:
• For every triple such that c < a+ b, the starting time T is necessarily 0.
• For every triple such that: c > 2a+ b, the starting time T is necessarily Tmax.
Proof. Let us consider the minimization problem of an agent that knows the starting
time T and is subject to an uncertainty σ on his arrival time. We want to show that for
any T , his choice of τ˜ will be such that τ˜ < T : this proves that the only possible fixed
point for T is zero.
Let us introduce w = t− T and write J as:
J = E

−cw t ≤ 0(≤ T )
−(c− a)w + aT 0 ≤ t ≤ T
(a+ b)w + aT t ≥ T
By hypothesis a + b > c > c − a, so it is clear that the cost relative to a positive w is
always higher than the one given by −w.
Since w ∼ N (τ −T, σ2) (a symmetrical distribution), this implies that the optimal τ lies
strictly before T .
For the other statement, the proof is very similar: for the same J , being by hypothesis
c > 2a+ b → c > c− a > a+ b, the above symmetry argument leads to the conclusion
that for every T , τ˜ lies after it and the only possible fixed point is Tmax. 
According to the above remarks, we run the model in this very particular case by limiting
the set of adopted parameters (a, 1, c) to the region:
(a, c) :
{
c < 2a+ 1
c > a+ 1
parametrized by
{
c = 1√
2
(u+ v)
a = 1 + 1√
3
(u+ 2v)
(u, v) ∈ R+× R+
so that our equilibrium time T (u, v) is not known immediately known from our cost
choice.
A graphical output of the result is:
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Figure 2.1: Equilibrium T for u, v ∈ [0.05, 8], uniform σ = 1, θ = 0.5
2.2.2 Agent population choice and quorum
After having shown that cost parameters can heavily influence the output significance,
we now try to adopt a more realistic set-up for the agent population, described in general
by (σ1, p1), . . . , (σh, ph).
Considering a time frame of 100 units, we arbitrarily divide the meeting participants in
three groups:
a) The organizers: they account for the 10% of total and have the lowest σ, set to 2.
b) The ones who come from afar: they account for 15% of total and have the largest
uncertainty, which we fix to 20.
c) The others: they are the remaining ones and have a medium value for σ, let us
say 6.
Coming to the quorum, we will consider a reasonable range, say: θ ∈ [0.41, 0.50].
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2.2.3 Some results
Here below we present some resuming graphs for the equilibrium value of T at various
quorum levels.
Note that the delay time increases as individuals care less about their formal late (rep-
utation cost) and more about the time they could wait (waiting cost), both referred to
a fixed level of personal lateness inconvenience (recall b = 1).
θ = 41% θ = 42%
θ = 43% θ = 44%
Figure 2.2: Equilibrium T for u, v ∈ [0.1, 8], various θ,heterogeneous population
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θ = 45% θ = 46%
θ = 47% θ = 48%
θ = 49% θ = 50%
Figure 2.3: Equilibrium T for u, v ∈ [0.1, 8], various θ, heterogeneous population
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We can run a single meeting simulation and calculate the actual realized T from the
quorum rule:
Figure 2.4: Arrival times of 1025 agents, a = 1.5, b = 1, c = 3, θ = 0.48 and heteroge-
neous population. The solid line is the actual T , dashed one is the mean field computed
T .
In the following graph we can observe the convergence of the realized T to the MFG com-
puted one due to the law of large numbers, by using an increasing sample of participants
and several realizations:
Figure 2.5: Same parameters as above, 7 different realizations for increasing values of
N .
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2.3 A digression on the concept of “continuum of agents”
This digression arises from the toy model presented in [16], where a continuum of agents
is considered.
This particular assumption can be frequently found in the literature, especially in Math-
ematical Economics: a good overview can be found in [2].
The most commonly employed framework considers every agent as subject to an idiosyn-
cratic standard Gaussian noise εi (meaning that (εi)i∈[0,1] is an i.i.d. N (0, 1) family)
and then it is claimed that the law of large numbers applies.
Some conceptual and technical issues are immediately encountered when trying to for-
malize the aggregate noise distribution F .
First of all, we would like to speak of a continuous family of independent (normal)
random variables on R. Does such an object exists?
The answer is yes, and the construction relies on Kolmogorov’s Extension Theorem,
helped by the fact that R is a σ-compact space: by asking for every finite dimensional
distribution to be a spherical Gaussian vector we have the existence of a process:
Z : (Ω,F ,P)→
(
R[0,1],B
(
R[0,1]
))
for some suitable probability space.
The real troubles come when we try to perform the aggregation and express the final
cumulative distribution. Let us fix the independent family:
(Zx)x∈[0,1] Zx ∼ N (0, 1) ∀x
A first aggregation formula can be proposed by analogy with the empirical distribution
in the finite case:
FN (t) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
1Zn≤t
moving to the continuum
=⇒ F (t) =
∫ 1
0
1Zx≤t dx (2.6)
where the Lebesgue measure on [0,1] has been used as weight to average the single
realizations.
The quite nasty fact is that the map x 7→ Zx needs not to be Lebesgue-measurable and
thus the integral above has in general no sense. This is strictly related to the fact that
the process Zx is not jointly measurable in (Ω×[0, 1],F⊗B([0, 1])).
Remark 5. Note that 1Zx≤t is a Bernoulli with parameter p = P{Z ≤ t}, so the integral
expression above for a certain (t) can be expressed as:
W =
∫ 1
0
Bx dx where (Bx)x∈[0,1] is a family of i.i.d. Bernoulli of parameter p (2.7)
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Our intuition would state that the above W should be constantly equal to p, since from
law of large numbers we expect that, given an infinite number of Bx, a deterministic
portion p of them takes value 1.
Surprisingly enough, this proves not to be true, since the set of variables which take
value 1 could be not measurable, or (even worse) its measure could be arbitrary and not
equal to p.3
This problem was already noticed by Doob [9]; since then, many different workarounds
have been proposed in order to back the intuitive use of LLN and independence with
rigorous foundations.
A brilliant comparison is presented in [2]; for our purpose we just mention the Fubini
extension approach, which was introduced with nonstandard arguments by Y. Sun [21]
and then recently expressed in the standard framework by K. Podczeck [20].
2.3.1 Extending the result to non identically distributed families
Now, supposing we managed to give full meaning to equation (2.6), this LLN application
can be generalized to non identically distributed continuous families.
For example, the meeting participants in [16] have real times determined by independent
Gaussian variables of varying mean and variance:
ti ∼ N (τi, σi) = τi + σiεi
Choosing [0, 1] as continuum indexing set, the resulting aggregate distribution is then
given by:
F (w) =
∫ 1
0
1{tx≤w} dx =
∫ 1
0
1{
εx≤w−τxσx
} dx =
∫ 1
0
1{εx≤g(x)} dx for a measurable map g(x)
Let us now assume that g(x) > −R for some R, then it exists a monotone succession
(gn) of simple functions in the form:
gn =
∑
k≤Nn
ak1Ak(x) for some measurable sets (Ak) in [0, 1]
such that gn(x) ↑ g(x), hence:∫ 1
0
1{εx≤gn(x)} dx ↑
∫ 1
0
1{εx≤g(x)} dx
3These negative results have been separately stated in 1985 by K.L. Judd and in the same year by
M. Feldman and C. Gilles, both in the Journal of Mathematical Economics.
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and we can now focus on the simpler integral:∫ 1
0
1{εx≤∑Nnk=1 ak1Ak (x)} dx =
∑
k≤Nn
∫
Ak
1{εx≤ak} dx+
∫
Ack
1{εx≤0} dx
and observe that the two terms are indeed two Bernoulli variables of parameters P {εx ≤ ak}
and P {εx ≤ 0}.
In this way we reduced the apparently hard problem of varying parameters (in this case
mean and variance) to the one represented by equation (2.7).
In conclusion, the fundamental question is still the following:
Given a continuum of independent coin tosses, it true that the portion
p of heads is deterministic and coincides with the underlying probability of
getting a head?
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Chapter 3
The full MFG scenario
Let us briefly recall our initial difficult problem in its infinite players limit (“mean field”)
formulation:
In the time interval [0,T], an infinite number of homogeneous agents inter-
act. Each agent i has starting condition Xi0, a random variable independent
from the others that has law m0, while his state X
i
t ∈ Rd evolves following a
controlled drift:
dXit = α
i
t dt+
√
2 dBit
The cost for an agent with state Xit observing m and adopting a control α
is given by:
J (α,m) = E
[∫ T
0
[
1
2
|αs|2 + F
(
Xis,m(· , s)
)]
ds+G
(
XiT ,m(· , T )
)]
What will our fixed-point reasoning involve this time? What are the mathematical tools
that will prove helpful to define the mean field?
The game we are considering is built upon a stochastic differential dynamic, so we expect
SDE and PDE theory to come in handy with our questions.
Let us begin by introducing some definitions.
Definition 4 (P1 space). We define P1 as the space of probability measures µ on B(Rd)
with finite first order moment,
∫
Rd |x|dµ(x) < +∞.
Hereby, it is assumed that all the measures in our exposition belong to P1.
In order to deal with convergence in P1, it seems very natural to introduce a distance:
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Definition 5 (Kantorovitch - Rubinstein distance). We define the following distance on
P1:
d1(µ, ν) = inf
γ∈Π(µ,ν)
[∫
R2d
|x− y| dγ(µ, ν)
]
where Π(µ, ν) is the following subset of probability measures on B(R2d):
Π(µ, ν) =
{
γ s.t. ∀A ∈ B(Rd), γ(A× Rd) = µ(A), γ(Rd ×A) = ν(A)
}
Theorem 6 (Equivalent definition for d1 - without proof). For any m,m
′ ∈ P1, it holds:
d1(m,m
′) = sup
f∈1−Lip
{∫
Rd
f(x) dm(x)−
∫
Rd
f(x) dm′(x)
}
By using d1, we can introduce the following distance on C0([0, T ],P1):
d˜1(µ, ν) = sup
t∈[0,T ]
d1(µ(t), ν(t)) for any continuous µ, ν : [0, T ]→ P1
It is also convenient to define the following space of real valued continuous functions:
Definition 7. We define Cl+α for an integer l ≥ 0 and α ∈ (0, 1) the set of continuous
functions u : Rd×[0, T ]→ R such that, for every non-negative integers r, s : 2r + s ≤ l,
the derivative (∂t)
r(∇)s exists, is bounded and both α-Ho¨lder in space and α/2-Ho¨lder
in time.
This space is complete if equipped with the norm:
‖u‖(l+α) =
∑
2r+s≤l
(‖(∂t)r(∇)su‖∞ + ‖(∂t)r(∇)su‖(x,α) + ‖(∂t)r(∇)su‖(t,α/2))
being:
‖f(x, t)‖(x,α) = sup
(x,t)∈Rd×[0,T ]
|x1−x2|<k0
|f(x1, t)− f(x2, t)|
|x1 − x2|α
and similarly for (t, α/2). Choosing different k0 given equivalent norms, so we neglect
this dependence.
We define the following functions and assume them to be continuous:
m : [0, T ] P1
t m(t)
F,G : Rd×P1 R
(x,m) F (x,m), G(x,m)
It follows that the maps:
(x, t) 7−→ F (x,m(t))
x 7−→ G(x,m(T ))
3.1. THE FIRST STEP: THE AGENT OPTIMAL CONTROL PROBLEM 29
are continuous.
We also consider a probability space (Ω,F ,P) and a filtration (Ft)t∈[0,T ] ⊂ F such that
an infinite family (Bit)i∈N of independent brownian motions, each of those is adapted to
(Ft), is defined on it.
3.1 The first step: the agent optimal control problem
As in section 1.2, we begin by studying the agent’s optimization problem under the
assumption that m(·, t) is known:
inf
αt∈A
J (α) = inf
αt∈A
E
[∫ T
0
[
1
2
|αs|2 + F (Xs,m(· , s))
]
ds+G (XT ,m(· , T ))
]
being
{
dXs = αs ds+
√
2 dBs for s ∈ [0, T ]
X0 ∼ m0
(3.1)
Let us properly specify the above formulation. As A we consider:
A =
{
αt ∈ L2
(
[0, T ]×Ω, Rd
)
; αt progressively measurable
}
and we assume that the maps:
(x, t) 7−→ F (x,m(t))
x 7−→ G(x,m(T ))
are continuous, bounded and 12 -Ho¨lder.
Under these hypotheses, dynamic programming theory (see [22]) proves the existence of
the following optimal control in feedback form:
α˜(Xt, t) = −∇u(Xt, t)
where the value function u(x, t) is C2 in space, C1 in time and verifies in the classical
sense the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman PDE for this optimal control problem.
In the following, we are going to partly justify the HJB origin and to rigorously prove
that under our assumptions it is a sufficient description of the optimal control α˜t.
To begin, let us introduce the value function for the above cost functional, assuming
that m is given:
u(x, t) = inf
α∈A
E
[∫ T
t
[
1
2
|αs|2 + F (Xs,m(· , s))
]
ds+G (XT ,m(· , T ))
]
being
{
dXs = αs ds+
√
2 dBs for t ≤ s ≤ T
Xt = x (the input variable is the initial condition)
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The value of u represents the cost that any player would assign to the state x at time t.
Stochastic control theory states that if u(x, t) is C2,1, it necessarily verifies a certain HJB
(see Prop 3.5, chap. 4 of [22]) in the classical sense; however, u needs not to have such
a regularity and from the above formulation it is not evident if this is the case.
A workaround for this obstacle is to adopt a verification technique: we can still write
the HJB assuming u ∈ C2,1, find a solution u˜(x, t) of class C2,1 and then apply some
verification theorem to prove that this solution is the value function u(x, t) for the
initial optimal control problem.
The rigorous derivation of the HJB equation requires vast premises, and would lead us
far from our aims.
Nevertheless, we find it interesting to present an heuristic derivation that holds if we
restrict the set of possible controls to a.s. continuous processes.
We begin by considering an intermediate time q ∈ [t, T ], and introduce the following
notation:
Aqt =
{
αs ∈ L2
(
[t, q]×Ω, Rd
)
; αs a.s. continuous and progressively measurable
}
Then, the Bellman optimality principle states that:
u(x, t) = inf
α∈Aqt
E
[∫ q
t
[
1
2
|αs|2 + F (Xs,m(· , s))
]
ds+ u(Xq, q)
]
being
{
dXs = αs ds+
√
2 dBs for t ≤ s ≤ q
Xt = x
(3.2)
We can move u(x, t) to the right side and write E[u(Xq, q) − u(x, t)] in integral form
using Ito’s formula:
0 = inf
α∈Aqt
E
[∫ q
t
[
1
2
|αs|2 + F (Xs,m(· , s)) +∇u(Xs, s) · αs + ∂tu(Xs, s) + ∆u(Xs, s)
]
ds
]
Let us now consider q = t + dt and let dt → 0. At the limit, the inf involves only the
control value at time t, denoted with α:
inf
α∈Rd
(
1
2
|α|2 + F (x,m(· , t)) +∇u(x, t) · α+ ∂tu(x, t) + ∆u(x, t)
)
dt = 0
The total cost contribution depending on α is then given by:
∇u(x, t) · α+ 1
2
|α|2
Thus we get, for every t:−∂tu−∆u− infα∈A
(
∇u · αt + 1
2
|αt|2
)
= F (x,m(· , t))
u(x, T ) = G (x,m(· , T ))
(3.3)
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It can be noticed that, for every α ∈ Rd:
min
α∈Rd
(
∇u · α+ 1
2
|α|2
)
= −1
2
|∇u|2 for α = −∇u(x, t)
And the final form of the HJB partial differential equation is:−∂tu+
1
2
|∇u|2 −∆u = F (x,m(· , t))
u(x, T ) = G (x,m(· , T ))
(3.4)
Thanks to the assumed regularity of F (x, t), G(x), theorem A.1 can be applied to the
above PDE (when adequately transformed - see section 3.3.1), providing the unique
existence of a classical solution u with bounded gradient ∇u. This assures the strong
existence and uniqueness of a solution to the closed loop state equation:{
dXt = −∇u(Xt, t) dt+
√
2 dBt, t ∈ [0, T ]
X0 ∼ m0
leading to the conclusion that α˜t = −∇u(Xt, t) is an admissible control. To prove that
it is optimal, we need a verification theorem.
Theorem 8 (Verification theorem for the agent optimal control problem).
Under the hypotheses at the beginning of the section, let u be the unique classical solution1
to the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation: − ∂tu−∆u+
1
2
|∇u|2 = F (x,m(t)) in Rd×(0, T )
u(x, T ) = G(x,m(T )) in Rd
(3.5)
Then the strategy defined by:
α˜ = −∇u(x, t)∣∣
x=Xit
= −∇u(Xit , t) (3.6)
is the optimal strategy for every agent i.
Its adoption causes the agents’ state to satisfy:{
dXt = −∇u(Xt, t) dt+
√
2 dBt, t ∈ [0, T ]
X0 ∼ m0
(3.7)
Proof. The last part is a straightforward consequence of the problem setting outlined in
equation (3.1).
1A unique solution exists for theorem A.1, which can be applied to the Hopf-Cole transformed version
of (3.5).
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We need to show that α˜t actually minimizes the cost functional, i.e.:
J (α˜) ≤ J (α) ∀αt ∈ A (3.8)
To begin we observe that Xt is an Ito process and therefore, recalling dXs = αs dt +√
2 dBs and (3.5), we get:
E[G(XT ,m(T ))] = E[u(XT , T )]
= E
[
u(X0, 0) +
∫ T
0
(∂tu(Xs, s) + αs · ∇u(Xs, s) + ∆u(Xs, s)) ds
]
= E
[
u(X0, 0) +
∫ T
0
(
1
2
|∇u(Xs, s)|2 + αs · ∇u(Xs, s)− F (Xs,m(s))
)
ds
]
Since, for every α ∈ Rd, 12 |∇u|2 +α · ∇u+ 12 |α|2 ≥ 0, we have 12 |∇u|2 +α · ∇u ≥ −12 |α|2
and thus:
E[G(XT ,m(T ))] ≥ E
[
u(X0, 0) +
∫ T
0
(
−1
2
|αs|2 − F (Xs,m(s))
)
ds
]
E[u(X0, 0)] ≤ E
[∫ T
0
(
1
2
|αs|2 + F (Xs,m(s))
)
ds+G(XT ,m(T ))
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=J (α)
Finally, if we set α = α˜t in the above, all the estimates become equalities, so:
J (α˜) = E[u(X0, 0)] ≤ J (α)
And this condition for an admissible control is sufficient for optimality. 
In this way we have shown that the uniquely solvable Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman PDE
characterises the optimal agent strategy for a given m(·, t). The first step is completed.
3.2 The second step: aggregation
Let us now suppose to equip every agent with the optimal feedback strategy resumed
by u.
What would we see at the aggregate level?
The state Xit of each agent is a process that verifies:{
dXit = −∇u(Xit , t) dt+
√
2 dBit, t ∈ [0, T ]
Xi0 ∼ m0
(3.9)
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Since (Xi0)i∈N and (Bit)i∈N are independent, the states Xit constitute an i.i.d. family.
Let us henceforth write Xt to denote a process with the same law of every X
i
t .
Let us now consider the “limit measure” definition of m(t), as initially introduced in
section 1.2:
m(t) = lim
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
δXit in the weak convergence
Naming µNt =
1
N
∑N
i=1 δXit , for every continuous and bounded φ : R
d → R we get:
∫
Rd
φ(x) dµNt (x) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
φ(Xit)
LLN−→ E [φ(Xt)] =
∫
Rd
φ(x) dm(t)(x)
This shows that m(t) coincides with the law of Xit for every i.
To determine m(t), the aggregate agent distribution at time t, it therefore suffices to
solve the SDE verified by Xt. To do this, a nice prompt is offered by a fundamental
property of the stochastic differential equations, the SDE–PDE correspondence.
To recall it, we need an important notion of weak solution for a particular parabolic
PDE, the Fokker-Planck equation.
Definition 9. For any continuous b : Rd×[0, T ]→ Rd, let us consider the Fokker-Planck
PDE: {
∂tm−∆m+ div (mb) = 0 in Rd×(0, T )
m(x, 0) = m0(x)
(3.10)
We say that a measure µ ∈ L1([0, T ],P1) is a probability measure solution of (3.10) if
for every φ ∈ C∞c (Rd×[0, T )) it verifies:∫
Rd
φ(x, 0) dm0(x) +
∫ t
0
∫
Rd
[∂tφ(x, s) +∇φ(x, s) · b(x, s) + ∆φ(x, s)] dm(s)(x) ds = 0
and the following correspondence can be proved:
Theorem 10. (Correspondence between SDE and PDE)
On one hand, let Xt be the unique strong solution of:{
dXt = b(Xt, t) dt+
√
2 dBt, t ∈ [0, T ]
X0 ∼ m0
(3.11)
where we assume that the initial distribution m0 has density, still denoted with m0(x),
on Rd and the vector field b : Rd× [0, T ] → Rd is continuous, uniformly Lipschitz in x
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and bounded.
On the other hand, consider the following (Fokker-Planck) PDE:{
∂tm−∆m+ div (m b) = 0 in Rd×(0, T )
m(x, 0) = m0(x)
(3.12)
Then the law of Xt has a density m(x, t) on Rd and this density weakly solves the above
Fokker-Planck partial differential equation.
Proof. Our proof relies on a direct use of Ito’s Formula. If φ(x, t) is bounded, C2 in
the spatial variable x and C1 in time, then for the Ito’s process Xt that verifies equa-
tion (3.11):
φ(Xt, t) = φ(X0, 0) +
∫ t
0
[∂tφ(Xs, s) +∇φ(Xs, s) · b(Xs, s) + ∆φ(Xs, s)] ds+
+
∫ t
0
∇φ(Xs, s) · dBs
We can take the expected value of both sides:
E [φ(Xt, t)] = E
[
φ(X0, 0) +
∫ t
0
[∂tφ(Xs, s) +∇φ(Xs, s) · b(Xs, s) + ∆φ(Xs, s)] ds
]
+
+ E
[∫ t
0
∇φ(Xs, s) · dBs
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
= 0
Writing explicitly the expected value in terms of m(t), the law of Xt, we have:∫
Rd
φ(x, t) dm(t)(x) =
∫
Rd
φ(x, 0) dm0(x)+
+
∫ t
0
∫
Rd
[∂tφ(x, s) +∇φ(x, s) · b(x, s) + ∆φ(x, s)] dm(s)(x) ds
In particular, substituting t = T and recalling that φ has compact support in Rd×[0, T ),
we obtain that m is a weak solution to equation (3.12).
It also true that it has density with respect to Lebesgue measure if the initial distribution
m0 has density, but we omit this part of the proof since it is quite technical and not
directly related to our objectives. 
Remark 6. In 2007, an important uniqueness result [3] has been established for proba-
bility measure-valued solutions of parabolic equations. Thanks to it, we can state that
the above Fokker-Planck admits a unique probability measure solution as in definition 9.
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Coming to our question, we can set:
b(x, t) = −∇u(x, t)
and find that if u(x, t) is regular enough, the law of Xt admits a density m(x, t) that
verifies: {
∂tm−∆m− div (m∇u) = 0 in Rd×(0, T )
m(x, 0) = m0(x)
(3.13)
What happens if we solve this PDE? Can we claim to have found the law of Xt?
Proposition 11. Under the same hypotheses adopted in theorem 10, the unique prob-
ability measure solution of (3.13) is the law of Xt.
Proof. Let us consider the agent state SDE (3.9) and recall that its initial condition X0
is supposed to have density m0 on Rd.
We know that it admits a unique strong solution Xt, whose law m(x, t) verifies the
PDE (3.13) for the above theorem. Hence, if we consider a weak probability measure
solution µ(x, t) to the Fokker-Planck with initial density m0, by uniqueness it has to be
µ(x, t) = m(x, t). 
We can conclude that the Fokker-Planck PDE fully describes the function m(·, t) for a
given value function u(x, t) and the second step of the mean field approach is completed.
3.3 The mean field games PDE formulation
Recollecting the findings from our previous steps we obtain a system of fully coupled
PDE: 
− ∂tu−∆u+ 1
2
|∇u|2 = F (x,m) in Rd×(0, T )
∂tm−∆m− div (m∇u) = 0 in Rd×(0, T )
u(x, T ) = G(x,m(T ))
m(x, 0) = m0(x)
(3.14)
Remark 7. Solving this system is equivalent to find the fixed point we have been looking
for in the previous chapters.
In fact, a solution (u,m) resumes both the individual optimization and the state aggre-
gation steps in a consistent manner: on one hand the optimal strategy described by u
produces m as mean field and on the other hand the mean field m is the one observed
by every agent when choosing u.
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Following [6], an important existence and uniqueness result can be proved for this setting
under some adequate assumptions.
We highlight that this coupled-type problem has been introduced less than ten years ago
and since then many different research paths have been opened. The hypotheses set we
are going to adopt offer a good compromise since they allow for a straightforward proof
exposition while still conserving the conceptual challenges of the mean field approach,
such as the necessity to deal with measure inputs and the strong coupling between the
two PDEs.
Theorem 12 (Existence and uniqueness). Let us assume that it exists some constant
C0 such that:
1. F and G are uniformly bounded by C0;
2. They are uniformly Lipschitz with constant C0 over their whole domain:
|F (x1,m1)− F (x2,m2)| ≤ C0[|x1 − x2|+ d1(m1,m2)]
|G(x1,m1)−G(x2,m2)| ≤ C0[|x1 − x2|+ d1(m1,m2)]
(3.15a)
Moreover, we require that m0 << L(Rd), and the density m0(x) = dm0dx is Ho¨lder con-
tinuous and satisfies: ∫
Rd
|x|2m0(x) dx < +∞
Finally, we assume the following (monotonicity) conditions on F and G:∫
Rd
(F (x,m1)− F (x,m2)) d(m1 −m2)(x) > 0 ∀m1 6= m2 ∈ P1∫
Rd
(G(x,m1)−G(x,m2)) d(m1 −m2)(x) ≥ 0 ∀m1,m2 ∈ P1
(3.15b)
Under the above assumptions, there exists a unique pair (u,m) such that u,m : Rd → R
are continuous, of class C2 in space and C1 in time and (u,m) satisfies (3.14) in the
classical sense. Such a pair is said to be a classical solution to the mean field problem.
We divide the proof in its two parts.
3.3.1 Existence proof
This proof is built upon a classical functional analysis approach. A good starting point
is the following set:
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Proposition 13. For every positive constant C1, let us define:
K =
{
µ ∈ C0([0, T ],P1) s.t. sup
s 6=t
d1(µ(s), µ(t))
|t− s| 12
≤ C1 and sup
t∈[0,T ]
∫
Rd
|x|2 dµ(t)(x) ≤ C1
}
We state that K is a convex compact subset of C0([0, T ],P1).
Proof. Closeness follows from the fact that both conditions in the definition are closed.
For convexity, let ν(t) = h1µ1(t) + h2µ2(t) be a convex combination of measures in K,
then:
d1(ν(t), ν(s)) = sup
f∈1−Lip
{
h1
[∫
Rd
f dµ1(t)−
∫
Rd
f dµ1(s)
]
+ h2
[∫
Rd
f dµ2(t)−
∫
Rd
f dµ2(s)
]}
= h1 d1(µ1(t), µ1(s)) + h2 d1(µ2(t), µ2(s))
≤ C1|t− s| 12 (h1 + h2) = C1|t− s| 12
and the integral conditions similarly holds for ν(t).
Finally, to prove the compactness of K in C0([0, T ],P1) is a rather subtle fact, and we
refer to [6]. 
The core of our investigation, the “mean field updating” map m = Ψ(µ), can be defined
from K to itself trough the usual two steps process:
1. Firstly, we introduce u as the unique solution of class C2+α to the HJB backward
equation with input µ: ∂tu−∆u+
1
2
|∇u|2 = F (x, µ) in Rd×(0, T )
u(x, T ) = G(x, µ(T )) in Rd
(3.16)
2. Then we define m = Ψ(µ) as the unique solution of class C2+α of the Fokker-Planck
forward equation.{
∂tm−∆m− div (m∇u) = 0 in Rd×(0, T )
m(x, 0) = m0(x) in Rd
(3.17)
This construction does not immediately imply that Ψ(µ) = m ∈ K for some C1 ∈ R+
(recall that K definition features the fixed constant C1).
Most of our proof will deal with the following proposition, which provides good premises
for the existence of a fixed point.
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Proposition 14. It exists a real positive constant C1 such that Ψ is well defined and
continuous from K to itself.
Proof. Let us prove that u exists and is unique in the class C2+α with the Hopf-Cole
transform, given by w = e
u
2 . Equation (3.16) transformed becomes:{
∂tw −∆w = wF (x, µ) in Rd×(0, T )
w(x, T ) = e
G(x,µ(T ))
2 in Rd
(3.18)
We observe here that the maps:
(x, t) 7−→ F (x,m(t)) and x 7−→ eG(x,µ(T ))2
belong to C 12 , since µ ∈ K and (3.15a) holds.
Therefore we can invoke some classical results on the heat equation (see theorem A.1 in
Appendix) to conclude that it exists a unique u in the class C2+ 12 .
Due to the assumptions (3.15a) on F and G some bounds for u can be derived using the
comparison principle. In the following, C0 is the constant introduced in the assumptions
of theorem 12, which is both an absolute bound and Lipschitz constant for F, G.
To derive an estimate, we observe that v = (1 + t− T )C0 verifies the equation:
∂tv −∆v = C0 where v(x, T ) = C0
Since F (x, µ(t))− 12 |∇u(x, t)|2 ≤ C0, it has to be:
u(x, t) ≤ v(x, t) ≤ (1 + T )C0 ∀(x, t)
The same argument applied to the equation −∂tu + ∆u = F (x, µ(t)) − 12 |∇u|2 verified
by −u bound leads to |u| ≤ (1 + T )C0.
Under the aforementioned assumptions also ∇u can be estimated.
Let us consider x, y ∈ Rd and a fixed time t ∈ [0, T ]. We denote with xα the optimal
control relative to the initial position x and introduce the following state laws on Rd:
X(α)s ∼
{
dXs = αs ds+
√
2 dWs
Xt = x
Y (β)s ∼
{
dYs = βs ds+
√
2 dWs
Yt = y
The HJB solution u(x, t), as shown in section 3.1, is the value function of the agent
optimal control problem. Hence it holds:
u(x, t) = inf
α∈A
E
[∫ T
t
[
1
2
|αs|2 + F (X(α)s , s)
]
ds+G(X
(α)
T )
]
= E
[∫ T
t
[
1
2
|xαs|2 + F (X(xα)s , s)
]
ds+G(X
(xα)
T )
]
≤ E
[∫ T
t
[
1
2
|yαs|2 + F (X(yα)s , s)
]
ds+G(X
(yα)
T )
]
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If we assign the same control yαs for both Xs, Ys, their law verifies the same SDE with
different initial conditions. Hence:
u(x, t)− u(y, t) ≤
≤ E
[∫ T
t
[
1
2
|yαs|2 − 1
2
|yαs|2 + F (X(yα)s , s)− F (Y (
yα)
s , s)
]
ds+G(X
(yα)
T )−G(Y (
yα)
T )
]
≤ E
[∫ T
t
C0|X(yα)s − Y (
yα)
s |ds+ C0|X(
yα)
T − Y (
yα)
T |
]
=
∫ T
t
C0|x− y|ds+ C0|x− y|
≤ (1 + T )C0|x− y|
In the same way, assigning xαs we get:
u(y, t)− u(x, t) ≤
≤ E
[∫ T
t
[
1
2
|xαs|2 − 1
2
|xαs|2 + F (Y (xα)s , s)− F (X(
xα)
s , s)
]
ds+G(Y
(xα)
T )−G(X(
xα)
T )
]
≤ (1 + T )C0|x− y|
Recollecting all our findings for u and ∇u, we have proved that:
|u| ≤ (1 + T )C0
|∇u| ≤ (1 + T )C0
(3.19)
Remark 8. Thanks to the uniform boundedness assumptions on F and G, these estimates
do not depend on C1 (which indeed affects µ).
We can now move to the second step related to Ψ definition.
Our aim, like before, is to prove that equation (3.17) has a unique solution m.
We rewrite the Fokker-Planck equation in the form:{
∂tm−∆m−∇m · ∇u−m∆u = 0 in Rd×(0, T )
m(x, 0) = m0(x) in Rd
(3.20)
and notice that:
a(x, t) = ∇m, b(x, t) = ∆u
belong to C 12 , since u ∈ C2+ 12 . Like before, the same heat equation general result can be
applied (theorem A.1) to deduce the unique existence of a solution m ∈ C2+ 12 .
Is this m in K? To answer, we should find a value for C1 so that Ψ(K) ⊂ K.
From section 3.2 we recall that m(t) is the law of Xt (a generic agent’s state) and depends
on ∇u trough the (3.7) SDE.
Some estimates can be derived by using equation (3.19) to control ∇u.
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Proposition 15. It exists a constant l0 = l0(C0, T ) such that:
a) d1(m(t),m(s)) ≤ l0(1 + C0)|t− s| 12 ∀s, t ∈ [0, T ]
b)
∫
Rd
|x|2 dm(t)(x) ≤ l0
(∫
Rd
|x|2 dm0(x) + 1 + C20
)
Proof.
a) Recalling definition 5 let us consider for s < t the pair (Xt, Xs): its law γ belongs
to Π(m(t),m(s)) and therefore it holds:
d1(m(t),m(s)) ≤
∫
R2d
|x− y|dγ(x, y) = E[|Xt −Xs|]
≤ E
[∫ t
s
|∇u((Xw, w)|dw
]
+
√
2E[|Bt −Bs|]
≤ ‖∇u‖∞(t− s) +
√
2
√
t− s since, for Z ∼ N (0, σ2), E|Z| = σ
√
2
pi
≤ C0(t− s) +
√
2
√
t− s
b) Coming to the integral estimate, it can be derived as follows:∫
Rd
|x|2 dm(t)(x) = E[|Xt|2] ≤ E
[∣∣∣∣X0 + ∫ t
0
|∇u((Xw, w)|dw +
√
2Bt
∣∣∣∣2
]
≤ 3E
[
|X0|2 +
∣∣∣∣∫ t
0
|∇u((Xw, w)| dw
∣∣∣∣2 + 2|Bt|2
]
≤ 3
(∫
Rd
|x|2 dm0(x) + t2‖∇u‖2∞ + 2t
)
≤ 3
(∫
Rd
|x|2 dm0(x) + T 2C20 + 2T
)
It is easy to choose a suitable l0(C0, T ) that complies with both estimates. 
Returning to our question on m, we observe that we can choose:
C1 = max
{
l0(1 + C0), l0
(∫
Rd
|x|2 dm0(x) + 1 + C20
)}
and deduce that m ∈ K and Ψ(µ) is well defined.
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Let us check that Ψ is continuous: if µn −→ µ in (K, d˜1), we want to show that:
mn=Ψ(µn) −→ Ψ(µ)=m in (K, d˜1)
We can denote with (un,mn) the pair of solutions corresponding to the input µn and
investigate the convergence of these solutions:
Definition 16 (Locally uniform convergence). A sequence of functions fn : E ⊃ D →
Rd, where D is a metric space, locally uniformly converges to f if for every element x in
the domain there exists a neighbourhood V such that:
fn
∣∣
V ∩D −→ f
∣∣
V ∩D uniformly
We can notice notice that
F (x, µn(t)) −→ F (x, µ(t))
G(x, µn(T )) −→ G(x, µ(T ))
with locally uniform convergence
since
∀ (x, t) ∈ Rd×[0, T ] |F (x, µn(t))− F (x, µ(t))| ≤ C0d˜1(µn, µ)
Therefore, since all the terms of the HJB system tend to their limits with locally uniform
convergence, also the value functions solutions do, due to the continuous dependence on
parameters of the value functions (Prop. 4.1 of chap. 4 from [22]):
un −→ u locally uniformly
Also the gradient of u, which enters the defining equation for m (equation (3.17)), has
good convergence properties:
Proposition 17. In the same framework, ∇un −→ ∇u with local uniform convergence.
Proof. Since ∇un is uniformly bounded as shown in (3.19), we introduce the uniformly
bounded sequence:
fn =
1
2
|∇un|2 − F (x, µn)
and we can apply an interior regularity result (theorem A.2) to the equation satisfied by
(un):
∂tun −∆un = fn
thus finding that ∇un converges uniformly to ∇u. 
We can move on to the last steps of our proof.
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Let mnk be any subsequence of mn; belonging to a compact set in a metric space, it
admits a converging sub-subsequence:
mnk −→ y ∈ K
every mnk satisfies:∫
Rd
φ(x, 0)m0 +
∫ t
0
∫
Rd
[∂tφ(x, s)−∇φ(x, s) · ∇unk(x, s) + ∆φ(x, s)]mnk(s) dx ds = 0
and for the limit y it holds:∫ t
0
∫
Rd
[∂tφ(x, s)−∇φ(x, s) · ∇unk(x, s) + ∆φ(x, s)](mnk − y)(s) dx ds =
=
∫ t
0
∫
Rd
Ξnk(x, s)(mnk − y)(s) dx ds −→ 0 ∇unk −→ ∇u
because that Ξnk are uniformly Lipschitz (φ has compact support) and we recall that
sup
t∈[0,T ]
d1(mnk(t), y(t)) −→ 0. Therefore we proved that y verifies (3.17).
But there exists a unique probability measure solution m to the Fokker-Planck equation2,
hence y = m and every subsequence mnk admits a converging sub-subsequence to the
same limit m.
In a metric space this suffices to conclude that mn → m and we have proved that Ψ(µ)
is well defined and continuous. 
Finally, we deduce the existence of a fixed point m by applying Schauder fixed point
Theorem (A.4) to the map Ψ, which we now know to be continuous from the compact
metric space K ⊂ C0([0, T ],P1) to itself.
3.3.2 Uniqueness proof
Let us take any two solutions to problem (3.14), (u1,m1) and (u2,m2) and set: u˜ =
u1 − u2; m˜ = m1 −m2.
From the Fokker-Planck equation we have, against any test function φ with compact
support in [0, T ]× Rd:
∂tm˜−∆m˜− div (m1∇u1 −m2∇u2) = 0[∫
Rd
m˜φ
]T
0
−
∫ T
0
∫
Rd
(∂tφ+ ∆φ) m˜+
∫ T
0
∫
Rd
∇φ · (m1∇u1 −m2∇u2) = 0 (3.21)
2Recall section 3.2 and [3].
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Remark 9 (A classical functional analysis result). We can use as test functions any map
belonging to C2, since it can be approximated by a sequence φn of regularized truncates.
Hence, we can use u˜ as test function φ.
The HJB equation instead yields, by multiplying by m˜ and integrating:
∂tu˜+ ∆u˜− 1
2
(|∇u1|2 − |∇u2|2)+ (F (x,m1)− F (x,m2)) = 0∫ T
0
∫
Rd
[
∂tu˜+ ∆u˜− 1
2
(|∇u1|2 − |∇u2|2)+ (F (x,m1)− F (x,m2))] m˜ = 0 (3.22)
Writing equation (3.21) with φ = u˜ we find: (note that m˜(0) = 0)∫
Rd
m˜(T )u˜(T )−
∫ T
0
∫
Rd
(∂tu˜+ ∆u˜) m˜+
∫ T
0
∫
Rd
∇u˜ · (m1∇u1 −m2∇u2) = 0 (3.23)
Adding equations (3.22) and (3.23) we get:∫
Rd
m˜(T )[G(m1(T ))−G(m2(T ))] +
∫ T
0
∫
Rd
∇u˜ · (m1∇u1 −m2∇u2)+
−1
2
∫ T
0
∫
Rd
(|∇u1|2 − |∇u2|2) m˜+ ∫ T
0
∫
Rd
(F (x,m1)− F (x,m2)) m˜ = 0
We can notice that:
∇u˜ · (m1∇u1 −m2∇u2)− 1
2
m˜
(|∇u1|2 − |∇u2|2) = m1|∇u1|2 +m2|∇u2|2+
−(m1 +m2)∇u1 · ∇u2 − 1
2
(
m1|∇u1|2 −m1|∇u2|2 +m2|∇u2|2 −m2|∇u1|2
)
=
=
1
2
[
m1|∇u1|2 +m2|∇u2|2 +m1|∇u2|2 +m2|∇u1|2
]− (m1 +m2)∇u1 · ∇u2 =
=
1
2
(m1 +m2)|∇u1 −∇u2|2 = 1
2
(m1 +m2)|∇u˜|2
So we end up with: ∫ T
0
∫
Rd
(F (x,m1)− F (x,m2)) m˜ =
= −
∫
Rd
[G(m1(T ))−G(m2(T )] m˜(T ) − 1
2
∫ T
0
∫
Rd
(m1 +m2)|∇u˜|2
Since the right side is either null or negative, it has to be:∫ T
0
∫
Rd
(F (x,m1)− F (x,m2)) d(m1 −m2) ≤ 0
Due the assumptions 3.15b, we deduce m˜ = 0 and therefore u1 = u2 for the uniqueness
of the HJB solution.
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3.4 MFG solution as an ε-Nash Equilibrium
In the previous sections we defined and built our mean field solution to the initial difficult
problem (page 5).
We are now ready to present and prove a very interesting result, which in our opinion is
a fair reward for the efforts made so far.
Let us consider the section 1.1 large N-player game, where costs are given by equa-
tion (1.2) (page 5) and do not include m (since N is finite). We suppose that the agents
adopt the mean field optimal strategies:
∀i α˜it = −∇u(Xit , t) =⇒ dXit = −∇u(Xit , t) dt+
√
2 dBit
We know these strategies to solve the infinite players limit game. Are they somehow
close to the N -player game solution?
The following theorem clarifies in what sense the mean field solution turns out to be a
“good approximation”, and its proof recollects many of the ideas we have developed so
far.
Theorem 18 (ε-Nash equilibrium property).
For any ε > 0, there is some N0 such that for every N ≥ N0 the symmetric strategy
(α˜1, . . . , α˜N ) is an ε-Nash equilibrium in the game (JN1 , . . . ,JNN ):
∀i JNi (α˜1, . . . , α˜N ) ≤ JNi
(
(α˜j)j 6=i, β
)
+ ε (3.24)
for all controls β ∈ A.
Proof. Let be ε > 0 fixed. Thanks to symmetry, it is enough to prove that for any
β ∈ A, definitely in N it holds:
JN1 (α˜1, . . . , α˜N ) ≤ JN1
(
(α˜j)j≥2, β
)
+ ε (3.25)
For a given β, let us denote with Xt the state of agent 1:
Xt :
{
dXt = βt dt+
√
2 dBt
X0 ∼ m0
His cost is then provided by equation (1.2):
JN1
(
(α˜j)j≥2, β
)
=
= E
[∫ T
0
1
2
|βs|2 ds+
∫ T
0
F
Xs, 1
N − 1
∑
j≥2
δ
Xjs
 ds+G
XT , 1
N − 1
∑
j≥2
δ
XjT

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Wβ,N
]
= E
[∫ T
0
1
2
|βs|2 ds+Wβ,N
]
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A first observation is that if β is such that (an “expensive control”):
E
[∫ T
0
1
2
|βs|2 ds
]
≥ 2(T‖F‖∞ + ‖G‖∞) + 1
2
E
[∫ T
0
|α˜1s|2 ds
]
:= R
Then we can immediately conclude, since:
JN1
(
(α˜j)j 6=i, β
) ≥ E [∫ T
0
1
2
|βs|2 ds
]
≥ R ≥ JN1 (α˜1, . . . , α˜N )
Hence, in the following we can assume that E
[∫ T
0
1
2
|βs|2 ds
]
≤ R.
It could be useful to find a bound of some kind for sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xt|; we proceed as follows:
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xt|2
]
≤ 3E
[
|X0|2 + 1
2
∫ T
0
|βs|2 ds+ 2 sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Bt|2
]
≤ 3E [|X0|2]+ 3R+ 24T︸ ︷︷ ︸
R1
where from Doob’s inequality we derived:
E
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Bt|2
]
≤ 4E[|BT |2] = 4T
Then, naming R1 the final right side written above, Chebishev’s inequality yields:
P
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xt| ≥ 1√
ε
]
≤ R1ε (3.26)
In the following (large) disc set we can prove that the mean field approximation works
fine:
D =
{
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|Xt| < 1√
ε
}
Since the other agents follow the mean field strategy, their states (Xjt )j≥2 form an i.i.d.
family of random variables3 with law m(t).
Therefore, we can apply a Hewitt-Savage corollary (theorem A.6 and corollary A.7) to
find an estimate for the cost difference between the finite N formulation and the mean
field one:
∀ t ∈ [0, T ], ∃N0 : ∀N ≥ N0
E
 sup
|y|≤1/√ε
∣∣∣∣∣∣F
y, 1
N − 1
∑
j≥2
δ
Xjt
− F (y,m(t))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
 ≤ ε
E
 sup
|y|≤1/√ε
∣∣∣∣∣∣G
y, 1
N − 1
∑
j≥2
δ
XjT
−G (y,m(T ))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
 ≤ ε
(3.27)
3See section 3.2, page 32
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In the first estimate, we can also choose N0 independently of t. In fact, thanks to the
Lipschitz conditions (3.15a), for any (s,t) it holds:
E
 sup
|y|≤1/√ε
∣∣∣∣∣∣F
y, 1
N − 1
∑
j≥2
δ
Xjt
− F
y, 1
N − 1
∑
j≥2
δ
Xjs
∣∣∣∣∣∣

≤ E
C0 d1
 1
N − 1
∑
j≥2
δ
Xjt
,
1
N − 1
∑
j≥2
δ
Xjs

and recalling definition 5 and proposition 15:
C0E
 d1
 1
N − 1
∑
j≥2
δ
Xjt
,
1
N − 1
∑
j≥2
δ
Xjs
 ≤ C0 1
N − 1
∑
j≥2
E
[∣∣∣Xjt −Xjs ∣∣∣]
≤ C0l0(1 + ‖∇u‖∞)(t− s) 12
Since [0, T ] is compact, this last estimate allows to choose N0 uniformly in t.
In fact, we can adopt it for both F
(
y, 1N−1
∑
j≥2 δXjt
)
and F (y,m(t)) and observe
that, for every ε > 0, condition (3.27) uniformly holds in every small time interval
[t− δε), t+ δε]. For example, we can set:
δε <
ε2
18C0l0(1 + ‖∇u‖∞)
Since it exists a finite cover of [0,T] made of such intervals, it suffices to define N0 as
the maximum in this cover to get a globally uniform bound.
We can now replace the Wβ,N term with the mean field version, since on the set D
this substitution is controlled by the above estimates, and Dc has an arbitrarily small
probability.
For any N ≥ N0 we find:
JN1
(
(α˜j)j≥2, β
)
= E
[∫ T
0
1
2
|βs|2 ds
]
+ E [Wβ,N |D]P(D) + E [Wβ,N |Dc]P(Dc) ≥
≥ E
[∫ T
0
[
1
2
|βs|2 + F (Xs,m(s))− ε
]
ds+G (XT ,m(T ))− ε
]
− P(Dc)2(T‖F‖∞ + ‖G‖∞)
≥ E
[∫ T
0
[
1
2
|βs|2 + F (Xs,m(s))
]
ds+G (XT ,m(T ))
]
− ε(1 + T )− εR12(T‖F‖∞ + ‖G‖∞)
≥ JN1
(
(α˜j)j=1,...,N
)− Lε since α˜1 is optimal
for some constant L independent from N, β. The inequality (3.24) is proved. 
Chapter 4
A model of imitative behaviours
in a population
The formulation discussed in chapter 3 can be easily employed to study the evolution of
a large population driven by imitative behaviours.
We consider a great number of agents having the same preferences; their
individual characteristics are resumed by a finite dimensional vector X ∈ Rd.
Every dimension represents a particular social aspect of the individual,
such as geographic position, wealth, education or fitness, and we assume that
everyone tries to resemble the others over time in order to feel more comfort-
able.
In order to do so, an agent can apply a drift α to his state, paying an in-
creasing cost for larger efforts, while at the same time his condition naturally
evolves following a random path.
Assuming to know the initial distribution m0, can we predict the overall
behaviour of the agents?
4.1 Model set-up
As in the previous chapter, we consider (Ω,F ,P) and a filtration (Ft)t∈[0,T ] ⊂ F such
that an infinite family (Bit)i∈N of independent brownian motions adapted to (Ft) is
defined on it.
Our first abstraction is to model the individual evolution with the following stochastic
differential equation:
dXit = αt dt+ σ dB
i
t in Rd
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where the additive noise Bit represents the natural state evolution that every agent
experiences.
We then choose the following payoff function to account for imitative preferences:
J = E
[∫ T
0
(
ln(m(Xit , t))−
1
2
|αt|2
)
e−%t dt
]
(4.1)
where m(x, t) is the agents’ distribution density in the “social space” Rd and % > 0 acts
as a discount factor.
4.2 PDE formulation
Let us derive the HJB equation for this model. To begin, we introduce the value function
u(x, t):
u(x, t) = sup
αt∈A
E
[∫ T
t
(
ln(m(Xs, s))− 1
2
|αs|2
)
e−%(s−t) ds
]
= sup
αt∈A
e%t E
[∫ T
t
(
ln(m(Xs, s))− 1
2
|αs)|2
)
e−%s ds
]
where:
A =
{
αt ∈ L2
(
[0, T ]×Ω, Rd
)
; αt progressively measurable
}
As in section 3.1, we can assume that u ∈ C2,1 and write the Bellman principle for an
intermediate time q:
u(x, t) = sup
αt∈Aqt
e%t E
[∫ q
t
(
ln(m(Xs, s))− 1
2
|αs|2
)
e−%s ds+ e−%qu(Xq, q)
]
Using Ito’s formula to express E[e−%(q−t)u(Xq, q)− u(x, t)] in integral form we find:
E
[
e−%(q−t)u(Xq, q)− u(x, t)
]
=
∫ q
t
d
ds
E
[
e−%(s−t)u(Xs, s)
]
ds
= e%t
∫ q
t
E
[
∇u(Xs, s) · αs − %u(Xs, s) + ∂tu(Xs, s) + σ
2
2
∆u(Xs, s)
]
e−%s ds
Substituting in the Bellman principle we get:
sup
αt∈Aqt
e%t E
[∫ q
t
(
ln(m(Xs, s))− 1
2
|αs|2 + σ
2
2
∆u(Xs, s)+
+∇u(Xs, s) · αs − %u(Xs, s) + ∂tu(Xs, s)
)
e−%s ds
]
= 0
4.2. PDE FORMULATION 49
We can now let q → t and assume to deal with a continuous control, obtaining:
sup
α∈Rd
(
ln(m(x, t))− 1
2
|α|2 + σ
2
2
∆u(x, t) +∇u(x, t) · α− %u(x, t) + ∂tu(x, t)
)
= 0
∂tu+
σ2
2
∆u+ ln(m(x, t))− %u+ sup
α∈Rd
(
∇u · α− 1
2
|α|2
)
= 0
The supremum is actually realized by:
max
α∈Rd
(
∇u · α− 1
2
|α|2
)
=
1
2
|∇u|2 for α = ∇u
The final form for the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation is then:∂tu+
σ2
2
∆u+ ln(m(x, t))− %u+ 1
2
|∇u|2 = 0
u(x, T ) = 0 (a conventional value)
(4.2)
Remark 10. Unfortunately, there is no immediate way to apply theorem A.1 to the above
PDE and deduce the existence of a unique classical solution.
Therefore, until we prove the existence of a classical u and the related verification the-
orem1, we can not claim that a solution to this HJB represents an optimal control
strategy.
Nevertheless, if we find a classical solution to the full MFG system, then we could
a posteriori investigate the equivalence of our HJB equation to the original stochastic
control problem. For comparison, the derivation made in section 3.1 has been allowed by
the strong hypotheses on F,G, which provided some a priori estimates for the solution.
Let us move on to the Fokker-Planck equation to build the full MFG system.
The state equation with the feedback candidate optimal control ∇u(Xt, t) is:{
dXt = ∇u(Xt, t) dt+ σ dBt, t ∈ [0, T ]
X0 ∼ m0
(4.3)
If m0 has density m0(x) on Rd and it exists a solution to (4.3), then its law verifies: ∂tm−
σ2
2
∆m+ div (m∇u(x, t)) = 0 in Rd×(0, T )
m(x, 0) = m0(x)
(4.4)
Like before, since we do not a priori know that u has a good regularity, we do not have
sufficient conditions on ∇u to claim that the closed loop equation (4.3) has a unique
1These are sufficient but not necessary conditions for the existence of an optimal control.
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solution2, so that the Fokker-Planck we derived describes the density of Xt. Again, we
look forward to solve the full MFG system and to verify a posteriori that our equations
are consistent with the initial problem.
Gathering the above results, we finally obtain this PDE system:

∂tu+
σ2
2
∆u+
1
2
|∇u|2 − %u = −ln(m(x, t)) in Rd×[0, T ]
∂tm+ div (m∇u) = σ
2
2
∆m in Rd×[0, T ]
m(x, 0) = m0
u(x, T ) = 0
(4.5)
We can recognize the backward/forward structure typical of the mean field approach:
given a dynamic for m, every agent optimizes his movements adopting his best possible
strategy (HJB backward equation). This consequently drives the aggregate evolution of
m itself (FP forward equation). If a unique solution exists, it is consistent both with
optimality and agent diffusion in the state space.
Then, the rationality assumption implies that this optimal solution will be effectively
adopted by everyone, so that the predicted evolution of m will be actually realized by
the agents’ behaviour.
Note that the mean field existence and uniqueness result of the previous chapter can
not be applied to the above formulation, since the HJB has unbounded coefficients and
theorem A.1 does not apply.
Nevertheless, we can still try to find an explicit solution.
4.3 A stationary solution
If we renounce to solve the system for every assigned initial condition m0, we can turn
things easier by looking for a stationary solution.
• By assuming a stationary distribution m, we immediately have a simplified diffu-
2This would be important also for the HJB consistency with the optimal control problem, since it
would show that the feedback candidate is admissible.
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sion equation:
div (m∇u) = σ
2
2
∆m
div
(
m∇u− σ
2
2
∇m
)
= 0
Which is verified if:
m∇u = σ
2
2
∇m
therefore a suitable form for m is:
m(x) = Ke
2
σ2
u(x) for K such that m is a probability measure
• Under the previous assignment and the stationarity requirement, the first HJB
equation becomes:
σ2
2
∆u+
1
2
|∇u|2 − %u = −ln(K)− 2
σ2
u
σ2
2
∆u+
1
2
|∇u|2 +
(
2
σ2
− %
)
u = −ln(K)
Here we assume that the last coefficient has positive sign, i.e. % < 2
σ2
, and we look
for a solution of the form:
u(x) = −η|x− µ|2 + ω
The equation becomes3:
−σ2ηd+ 2η2|x− µ|2 + %η|x− µ|2 +
(
2
σ2
− %
)
ω − 2η
σ2
|x− µ|2 = −ln(K)(
2η2 + %η − 2η
σ2
)
|x− µ|2 = σ2ηd−
(
2
σ2
− %
)
ω − ln(K)
• This yields the following relations for our parameters:
2η2 + %η − 2η
σ2
= 0 =⇒ η = 1
σ2
− %
2
σ2ηd−
(
2
σ2
− %
)
ω − ln(K) = 0
Ke
2ω
σ2
∫
Rd
e−
2η
σ2
|x−µ|2 = Ke
2ω
σ2
(
piσ2
2η
) d
2
= 1
=⇒ ln(K) = −2ω
σ2
− d
2
ln
(
piσ2
2η
)
From the last equation we deduce:(
1− σ
2
2
%
)
d+ %ω =
d
2
ln
(
2η
piσ2
)
and therefore ω can be determined.
3The Laplacian ∆u gives: ∆u = div (∇u) = −2η div (x− µ) = −2ηd
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• In conclusion, we have found the following Gaussian distribution for m:
m(x) = Ke−
2η
σ2
|x−µ|2 ∼ N (µ, s2Id) where s2 = σ4
4− 2%σ2 (4.6)
This solution shows that uniqueness does not hold in this framework, since our problem
is invariant by translation (given by µ in the formula above). Even if we fix an origin to
avoid this issue, uniqueness can not be granted (see [16], cap. 5).
Instead, as a positive result, we observe that ∇u is a linear function and therefore the
equation (4.3) has a unique strong solution. The optimal control αt = ∇u(Xt, t) is then
admissible and a verification theorem very similar to theorem 8 can be proved.
This model shows how easily the application of the MFG theory to real-like scenarios
can lead to mathematically challenging problems, even when elementary payoff functions
are involved.
Chapter 5
An individual-based human
capital growth model
In this chapter we adopt the mean field game perspective to build an economic human
capital growth model based on individual choices.
Our exposition is inspired by [16, 15], but differs in the adopted model structure since
it consider independent noises for every agent. See section 5.3 for details.
Our ambition is to model the individual wealth growth in a stylized econ-
omy with a large numbers of interacting agents. We assume that their salaries
are determined by the human capital distribution across the population and
we denote with X the positive real amount of human capital every agents is
endowed with.
A higher level of human capital allows for an increase in income due to
the combination of two effects: the added value of being more competent and
the decrease in the number of people that have a similar skill level.
Of course, enhancing their own human capital has a cost for individuals,
and this cost sharply increases with their current level of competence, so that
reaching the technological frontier becomes more and more expensive.
Each agents tries to maximize its lifetime wealth, knowing that the initial
distribution of agents on the human capital line (and therefore income) is not
uniform.
Let us now analyse the details of the above brief description with the elements introduced
in chapter 3.
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5.1 Model set-up
As always, we consider a probability space (Ω,F ,P) and a filtration (Ft)t∈[0,T ] ⊂ F
such that an infinite family (Bit)i∈N of independent brownian motions adapted to (Ft)
is defined on it.
For this model, the state space where agents’ conditions evolve is the real positive half
line, X ∈ (0,+∞).
We name m(x, t) the agent’s density over the possible levels of human capital and M its
cumulative distribution, while as always m(x, 0) is the initial density value.
We want to model the knowledge tendency to increase and not to assume negative values,
so an additive Brownian noise does not fit in this particular scenario.
A possible choice for the (stochastic) human capital accumulation process of an agent i
adopting at is given by:
dXit = at dt+ σXt dB
i
t (5.1)
where we assume that at ≥ 0.
Remark 11. This state equation is significantly different from equation (3.7), since the
volatility term varies with the state Xt.
We can now look forward to formulate the agent’s optimization problem. Let us define
the income w as function of human capital level x:
w(x,m(x, t)) =
C
xα
m(x, t)β
if x is in the support of m(·, t)
0 otherwise
(5.2)
where we introduced the real positive α and β such that α + β > 1 and the positive
constant C.
Remark 12. Note that the above choice well models the opposite effects on salary of
human capital level and abundance of similarly skilled workers.
Coming to the cost of increasing x at rate a, we set:
H
(
a,M(x, t)
)
= S
aα+β
(α+ β)[1−M(x, t)]β (5.3)
where S is a positive constant measuring inefficiency in human capital production and the
exponents (α, β) are the same used above, so that the cost of human capital increasing
is a convex function of the desired speed.
This choice for H keeps track of the dependence on both the increase speed and the
proximity to the technological limit.
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The next step is to specify an initial distribution m0 of human capital (and therefore
income), which we assume to have density m(x, 0) on R+.
This choice should reflect the real income distribution in the population, therefore we
adopt a Pareto law with coefficient k and conventionally set its starting point to 1.
m(x, 0) = k
1
xk+1
1x≥1
In fact, this type of distribution can be widely found in income inequality studies, such
as papers from T.Piketty or A.B. Atkinson. The coefficient k ≥ 1 is an inverse indicator
of inequality; the corresponding Gini index is given by G = 1/(2k − 1).
The final step of our model set-up is to declare the agent payoff and formulate the related
optimization problem:
sup
at∈A
J (a) = sup
at∈A
E
[∫ T
0
(
C X
α
t
m(Xt, t)β
− S a
α+β
t
(α+ β)[1−M(Xt, t)]β
)
e−%t dt
]
(5.4)
being
{
dXt = at dt+ σXt dBt for s ∈ [0, T ]
X0 ∼ m(x, 0)
where the set of admissible controls is:
A =
{
at ∈ L2
(
[0, T ]×Ω, R+) ; at progressively measurable}
and % > 0 provides a discount factor.
5.2 PDE formulation
In order to express the differential formulation of the mean field problem, let us set for
simplicity:
α = β = 1
so that the payoff equation (5.4) becomes:
J (a) = E
[∫ T
0
(
C Xt
m(Xt, t)
− S a
2
t
2[1−M(Xt, t)]
)
e−%t dt
]
Let us introduce the value function u:
u(x, t) = sup
at∈A
E
[∫ T
t
(
C Xs
m(Xs, s)
− S a
2
s
2[1−M(Xs, s)]
)
e−%(s−t) ds
]
= sup
at∈A
e%t E
[∫ T
t
(
C Xs
m(Xs, s)
− S a
2
s
2[1−M(Xs, s)]
)
e−%s ds
]
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The corresponding HJB equation can be derived trough the same heuristic steps adopted
in sections 3.1 and 4.2, resulting in:
∂tu+
σ2
2
x2∂2xxu− %u+ sup
a∈R+
(
a ∂xu− S a
2
2[1−M(x, t)]
)
+ C x
m(x, t)
= 0
Being, for every a ∈ R+,
max
a∈R+
(
a ∂xu− S a
2
2[1−M(x, t)]
)
=
1−M(x, t)
2S
(∂xu)
2
for a =
1−M(x, t)
S
∂xu
the final form for the HJB equation is:∂tu+
σ2
2
x2∂2xxu+
1−M(x, t)
2S
(∂xu)
2 − %u = −C x
m(x, t)
u(x, T ) = 0
(5.5)
The argument of the maximum suggests this feedback form for the optimal control:
a˜t = a˜(Xt, t) =
1−M(Xt, t)
S
∂xu(Xt, t)
but we have no immediate argument to prove that that a˜t is admissible. In fact, the
closed loop equation: dXs =
1−M(Xs, s)
S
∂xu(Xs, s) dt+ σXs dBs s ∈ [t, T ]
Xt = x
(5.6)
needs not to admit a solution, since we lack of a priori information about u. Like in
section 4.2, we can not prove a verification theorem for the HJB equation at this stage.
Coming to the Fokker-Planck that describes the aggregate density m(x, t), we can apply
the classical PDE-SDE relationship to equation (5.6) and get:∂tm = −∂x(a˜tm) +
σ2
2
∂2xx
(
x2m
)
m(x, 0) = k 1
xk+1
1x≥1
(5.7)
substituting for a˜t and expanding we obtain:
∂tm+ ∂x
(
m
1−M
S
∂xu
)
− σ
2
2
∂2xx
(
x2m
)
= 0
∂tm+
1−M
S
(
∂xm∂xu+m∂
2
xxu
)− σ2
2
(
x2 ∂2xxm+ 4x ∂xm+ 2m
)
= 0
∂tm+
(
1−M
S
∂2xxu− σ2
)
m+
(
1−M
S
∂xu− 2σ2x
)
∂xm− σ
2x2
2
∂2xxm = 0
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Collecting all the results, the final coupled PDE problem for our model is:
∂tu+
σ2
2
x2∂2xxu+
1−M
2S
(∂xu)
2 − %u = −C x
m
∂tm+
(
1−M
S
∂2xxu− σ2
)
m+
(
1−M
S
∂xu− 2σ2x
)
∂xm− σ
2x2
2
∂2xxm = 0
m(x, 0) = k
1
xk+1
1x≥1
u(x, T ) = 0
(5.8)
These non-linear, fully coupled backward-forward PDE equations are the core of the
mean field game problem.
These kinds of systems lie on the mathematical research frontier: for problem (5.8) we
do not dispose of any existence theorem to apply, nor an explicit solution can be easily
written.
Nevertheless, we find it very remarkable to have transformed our introductory model
purpose into problem (5.8) thanks to the mean field approach versatility.
In doing this, we experienced the dual nature of mean field games theory: on one side,
it constitutes a very interesting challenge that lies on the frontier of mathematics; on
the other, it has the potential to become a powerful empirical tool once taken to reality.
5.3 Comparison with common noise models
The stochastic mean field model that is presented in [16, 15] uses a particular simplifying
assumption to introduce randomness and hence admits an explicit solution.
Instead of considering N independent noises dBit, a common Brownian motion dWt acts
on the state equation of all agents, describing evolving external conditions that equally
affects the agents’ states.
This leads the mean field m to depend on the particular realization of Wt and not to be
deterministic; on the other hand, along a fixed trajectory Wt(ω) the function u results
from a deterministic optimization and its HJB equation has no second order term.
We chose not to present this version of the model for it does not feature the aggre-
gate uncertainty smoothing mechanism that we analysed in the previous chapters (see
figure 2.5, page 22).
Some authors are currently performing research on general settings that feature both
the idiosyncratic and the common noise terms, which is indeed a complicate scenario
because it simultaneously deals with a non deterministic mean field and a stochastic
optimization for the agents’ strategies. An interesting preprint on the subject is [7].
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Chapter 6
Prospects and conclusion
We are now concluding our travel trough mean field games.
After the initial outline, we presented the core intuitions of the mean field approach
trough a thoroughly analysed toy model, discussing the role of rationality, symmetry,
and the fixed-point reasoning keystone.
We then moved on to visit the theory frontier, proved an existence and uniqueness result
and seized the ε-Nash recognition for our efforts.
Towards the end we deployed our tools in some economic flavoured scenarios, discovering
their surprising versatility and emphasising the new open problems they pose.
Our travel has been driven by a strong belief in the future relevance of mean field games,
both as a research topic in mathematics and empirical tool.
We indeed expect economists, statisticians, engineers and medical researchers to enjoy
great benefits from mean field games development, since many difficult coupled PDE
problems directly arise in these applications.
To conclude, we are glad to back these expectations by sharing some current prospects
for mean field games.
• Large heterogeneous agents models in Economics
Lasry and Lions are now taking part to a promising research group at Princeton
Economics. Thanks to mean field games theory, a broad category of heterogeneous
agents macroeconomics models can now be investigated, both analytically and
numerically. A draft paper that describes these frontier applications is [1].
Similar methods are being studied also at the European Central Bank: a working
paper is [19].
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• Testing rationality
Being an efficient way to describe an approximate Nash equilibrium, mean field
games could provide a “benchmark aggregate behaviour” for many real interac-
tions. By developing adequate statistical tools, it could be investigated how real
(maybe irrational) aggregate outcome differs from the rational theoretical one, thus
measuring the likelihood of the rationality assumption at the aggregate level.
• Financial networks
Themes such as interbank contagion, financial connectedness and systemic risk are
widely studied after the recent world financial crisis. Some authors are currently
adopting the mean field game approach to model the banks’ network: a preprint
is [8].
• Cancer evolution models in Medicine
Mathematical oncology has greatly expanded in the last decade, yet many of its
initial objectives have been redefined during its evolution.
Current research attempts to describe the evolution mechanisms that characterize
the various phases of a tumour. Such a model could be employed by diagnosticians
to determine the phase a tumour is in given a few time-lapsed observations.
The mean field perspective can effectively help to deal with the complex microscopic-
macroscopic interactions that occur in tumour evolution, leading to macroscopic
PDE–ODE models. Related literature is flourishing; a representative example is
[13]. In this framework, the game theory modelling of cell behaviour constitutes a
novelty (see [5]) that could pave the way for future developments.
Appendix
This section is mainly addressed to recollect some important Functional Analysis results.
General references are [4, 14, 10].
Theorem A.1 (Heat equation existence and uniqueness). This theorem is taken from
[14], and we recall definition 7.
Let us consider the following heat equation:{
∂tw −∆w − a(x, t) · ∇w − b(x, t)w = f(x, t) in Rd×(0, T )
w(x, 0) = g(x) in Rd
(A.1)
If, for some α ∈ (0, 1), ai ∀i, b, f, g belong to Cα and are bounded, then the equation
above has a unique classical solution w ∈ C2+α.
Remark A.1. Note that this result holds also for the following backward formulation,
where vT is known in place of v0:{
∂tv + ∆v + a(x, t) · ∇v + b(x, t)v = −f(x, t) in Rd×(0, T )
v(x, T ) = g(x) in Rd
(A.2)
In fact, if suffices to set v(x, t) = w(x, T − t) and apply the above theorem.
Theorem A.2 (Interior regularity for a class of PDE solutions). Let us consider the
following form of heat equation:{
∂tw −∆w = f(x, t) in Rd×(0, T )
w(x, 0) = w0(x) in Rd
(A.3)
If we require f to be continuous and bounded, any classical, bounded solution of this
equation verifies, for any compact set K ⊂ Rd×(0, T ):
sup
(x,t),(y,s)∈K
|∇w(x, t)−∇w(y, s)|
|x− y|β + |t− s|β/2 ≤  L(K, ‖w‖∞)‖f‖∞ (A.4)
where β ∈ (0, 1) depends on d and L depends more broadly on K, ‖w‖∞ and d.
Theorem A.3 (A compactness criterion for sets in P1). Let r < 1 and C ⊂ P1 be such
that:
sup
µ∈C
∫
Rd
|x|r dµ(x) < +∞
Then the set C is relatively compact with respect to the d1 distance.
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Theorem A.4 (Schauder fixed point). Let E be a Banach space, C be a nonempty closed
convex set in E and K a compact subset of C.
Then every continuous map Ψ : C −→ K ⊂ C has a fixed point in K.
We take some space to recall some important and useful measure theory findings.
Definition A.5 (Symmetric measure). A measure µ on the compact metric space (Q)n
is symmetric if for every permutation σ ∈ Sn it holds:
µ(xσ(1), . . . , xσ(n)) = µ
Theorem A.6 (Hewitt-Savage). Let (mn) be a sequence of symmetric probability mea-
sures on (Q)n, where Q is a compact metric space, such that:∫
Q
dmn+1(xn+1) = mn ∀n ≥ 1
Then there is a probability measure µ on P(Q) which verifies, for any continuous map
f ∈ C0(P(Q)):
lim
n→∞
∫
Qn)
f
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
δxi
)
dmn(x1, . . . , xn) =
∫
P(Q)
f(m) dµ(m)
Moreover,
mn(A1, . . . , An) =
∫
P(Q)
m(A1) · · · (An) dµ(m) ∀n, A1, . . . , An ∈ B(Q)
Corollary A.7. Let m0 ∈ P1 be a measure on X = Rd and let mN = ⊗Ni=1m0 be the law
on XN of N i.i.d. random variables (Y1, . . . , YN ) with law m0. Then, for any Lipschitz
continuous map f ∈ C0(P1) it holds: (note that f accepts measures as input)
lim
N→∞
∫
XN
f
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
δxi
)
dmn(x1, . . . , xn) = lim
N→∞
E
[
f
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
δYi
)]
= f(m0)
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